In a recent issue of the European Journal of Public Health
Barendregt and Bonneux 1 argue that 'the trouble with health economies', in particular economic evaluations of health care programmes, is that outcomes 'depend to a large extent on arbitrary decisions in study design', while in more theoretical discussions economists would 'display an unseemly rigidness'. Barendregt and Bonneux conclude that although standardisation of methodology is needed, it is not sufficient and health economists will 'have to be more aware of the value judgements underlying their methods, and be prepared to adjust their methods to reflect empirically measured preferences'. In this reply we want to address the issues raised by Barendregt and Bonneux, placing them in a broader context of economic literature and also correcting some inaccuracies in Barendregt and Bonneux's paper. Specifically, we will address the topics of which costs to include in an economic evaluation, how to value 'life years', discounting of costs and effects and health economics as an aid to policy makers. We will make clear that it is not health economics as such that is troublesome, but the task which health economists have taken on board. Assisting policy makers to make informed choices in health care, necessarily involves making value judgements that may be supported by empirical research, but cannot fully be based on empirical observations. Indeed, it is the task of normative economics (in contrast to descriptive or positive economics) to inform about the relative desirability of possible strategies in health policy.
THE ECONOMIC ROOTS OF ECONOMIC EVALUATION
Economic evaluation may be viewed as applied welfare economics. This important field in the economic discipline is concerned with assessing whether changes in society can be viewed as enhancing total welfare (or as economists would put it: utility). 5 Also, alternative specifications of the utility function in the QALY-model have been put forward. Besides QALYassessment at the individual level, there has been much attention given to the measurement of societal preferences for QALY-gains in different patient-groups, e.g. younger versus older" or gains in patients with a poor health state to begin with versus those in better health states.
1 Although very helpful and important, it should be noted that empirical measurement cannot replace normative choices. An example here is who's valuation of health states should be used in the analysis: that of the patients, that of the general public, that of the policymaker etc. In the application of welfare economics to the health care setting, the objective of health care is generally defined as maximising health gains (often in terms of QALYs) subject to a health care budget. These health gains are therefore not valued monetarily, like in the traditional application of welfare economics, cost-benefit analysis, amongst other reasons because it is extremely difficult to monetarise health gains. Barendregt and Bonneux's suggestion, that lost life years are valued in cost-of-illness studies through the human capital method or the friction cost method, is a mistake. Neither the human capital method, nor the friction cost method are developed to value lost life years, but merely lost productivity. Health economists do not value life according to one's productive capacities. They accept that life has an intrinsic value that goes beyond productive possibilities and this value is reflected in the QALY-measure.
WHAT TO INCLUDE IN THE ANALYSIS?
Barendregt and Bonneux have difficulties with the incorporation of costs outside the health care sector. They tend to rej ect the incorporation of indirect costs and other non-health care costs because of two main reasons:
• there's no obvious stopping rule for including other costs; • no standard methods for imputing values exist, leading to discrepancies in methods used and outcomes (and debate on which method is correct). Indeed, Barendregt and Bonneux are right to assert that taking a societal perspective in economic evaluations leads to a higher number of cost items with a potential large impact on total cost estimates than in the case where the analysis is restricted to only health care costs. And indeed, changes in society from one particular intervention may be a reaction chain and it is difficult to assess where to stop measuring in that chain. Fortunately, this difficulty has been recognised by health economists, and guidelines prove to be helpful in this area. For instance Gold et al. 2 indicate that only those cost categories need to be taken into account that have a substantial influence (which may even be specified if this is considered useful) on the outcomes of an analysis. Other cost items may be left out of the analysis or their impact may be demonstrated tentatively in a sensitivity analysis. Why bother analysing cost items that have no substantial influence anyway? Researchers should specify which cost-items were included (and which were left out) and provide an explanation, so that policy makers (and peer reviewers) may assess their choices. Regarding the issue of where to stop, there have been studies attempting to measure the chain of consequences, for instance using a macro-economic model. 11 ' 12 From these experiences general advice can be given on the relevance of cost categories that are indirect consequences of health care interventions, as is attempted in the friction cost approach. Also, attempts to assess the relevance of, for instance, medical and non-medical costs in gained life-years have been reported. ^'Ô f course, one may wonder why it is necessary to adopt the societal perspective in economic evaluation. This is motivated by two main reasons: i) welfare changes need to be determined by assessing their full impact; and ii) a policymaker needs to be informed about the full consequences of implementing a certain programme. The first reason is strongly related to the economic roots of economic evaluation as described above. Consider two alternative programmes to illustrate this. Programme A costs $10,000 per QALY gained if only health care costs are included, while programme B costs $ 11,000 per QALY if only health care costs are included. All other things being equal, in Barendregt and Bonneux's decision framework A should be preferred over B. However, A may involve hospitalisation for one month and rehabilitation for two weeks, while B is a drug treatment that allows patients to continue their normal activities reasonably well, such as paid and unpaid work. The costs of reduced productivity in programme A (absenteeism from work and lost unpaid work) are estimated at $3,000, while there are only minor costs of reduced ability to work in programme B ($500). According to welfare economics these other welfare changes (a loss of $500 or of $3,000) need to be taken into account as well, as they influence the welfare of a society. For society as a whole the costs of programme A are therefore $13,000 versus $11,500 for programme B. Thus from a societal viewpoint program B would be preferred. That this is quite reasonable may be derived from the notion that in principle the resource gains of choosing programme B instead of A could be used in the health care sector to produce even more QALYs! Policymakers in health care are probably interested in these gains and losses in other sectors of society, even though they may only be responsible for the health care budget.
The problem of what to take into account in the analysis is also present at the effect side of the evaluation. Although not explicitly mentioned in those terms, Barendregt and Bonneux touch upon that subject when they discuss an example provided in the textbook on economic evaluation, which gives state of the art guidelines of a US Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine. Barendregt and Bonneux react to an example of an economic evaluation of supplementing folic acid for the prevention of neural tube defects. They suggest that the number of neural tube defects avoided should be the outcome parameter rather than the QALYs of the child, as the former outcome parameter incorporates the preferences of the parent. But the problem with this solution is that the outcome parameter, although on a patient and 'significant other' level (i.e. parents) perhaps appropriate, is not comparable across interventions and has no valuation dimension. In other words, if we consequently try to decide between funding of this intervention and heart-transplants or even Viagra, no common denominator is found. Although we fully agree that the wellbeing of persons closely related to the patient (be it parents or others, like partners) can and should be taken into account in an economic evaluation of health care interventions, we would conclude that the scope for outcome parameters should be broadened rather than narrowed as Barendregt and Bonneux propose. This could, for instance, be operationalised by measuring quality of life of parents or caregivers. By further developing methods to measure quality of life in 'significant others' and incorporating the results in the analysis (at first as a separate effect-measure, not to be simply added to quality of life changes in patients), policymakers may be better informed about the broader effects of an intervention. Interestingly, the US Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine 2 are one of the first to indicate that such a broad view on outcomes is appropriate from a societal perspective. Indeed, such a view is more closely related to the aim of maximising social welfare.
DISCOUNTING FUTURE COSTS AND EFFECTS
Barendregt and Bonneux address the topic of discounting costs and effects in economic evaluation ('an obscure technicality'), but unfortunately do not refer to important empirical and theoretical work performed by health economists in this area. Empirical measurement of stated time preference -note that the empirical assessment of preferences is advocated by Barendregt and Bonneuxshows discount rates of up to annually 25% for a 20-year time horizon, 12% for a 50-year time horizon and still an annual discount rate of 8% for a 100-year time horizon.
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Under those discount rates, that by the way reflect a hyperbolic discount function (the nearby future is discounted stronger and the far future less annually -a common finding when assessing individual discount rates), the preventive medicine programmes that Barendregt and Bonneux try to justify by calling discounting arbitrary and an obscure technicality, would turn out even less cost-effective. Somehow, it seems to be a strong preference of individuals to focus on the here and now. Rather than using stated preferences some authors prefer to use revealed time preference, for instance by considering the returns on riskless government bonds. These discount rates reflect a broader societal time preference, and may thus be considered a basis for the discounting procedure. If so, a policymaker may choose not to or only marginally discount effects gained through preventive medicine. Moreover, the social welfare function is also assumed to incorporate equity concerns and there exists an increasing amount of literature that suggests diat society prefers to spend money on those already in bad health states than to spend health care resources on the now healthy and prevent illness from occurring in 10 years (e.g. through breast cancer screening). On the other hand, the (future) health of babies may be important enough for individuals to value die gains of preventive child health care higher than gains in older persons. Economists try hard to resolve diis problem by further refining economic evaluation, incorporating equity concerns, and perhaps equity weighted time preference. We do not want to give a full discussion of the difficulties that health economist face in deciding a rate of time preference, note that health economists face these difficulties because different societal time preferences can be and are found and diat no one, health economists nor other scientists, empirically or theoretically can find the appropriate rate. That is why (healfii) economics is an aid in decision making and not a prescription for decision i making. 20 
CONCLUSIONS
Barendregt and Bonneux are right in arguing diat health economics is not without problems, but diey tend to ridicule the way healdi economists tackle diem. Furthermore, dieir advice to focus on empirical observation and stick to simple outcome measures is not very helpful, as we hope to have pointed out. We agree that empirically validated preferences should drive healdi economic models, but already much research effort is made in diat direction. Concluding, we agree diat making choices in healdi care is troublesome, but it is exactly healdi economics diat may prove to be a bridge over troubled water.
